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P
ublic sector debt in the industrialized
world has increased dramatically over the
last 15 years. From 1980 to 1994, govern-
ment debt rose from 37 percent of GDP to 63
percent in the United States, and from 41 percent
to 70 percent in the major industrialized coun-
tries. At the June 1996 Economic Summit in
Lyon, France, leaders of the seven major indus-
trialized democracies discussed the problems
posed by large budget deficits and debt, as well
as the potential benefits of regaining fiscal bal-
ance. The G-7 leaders agreed that while eco-
nomic fundamentals in their countries are
sound, investment growth, income growth, and
job creation all depend on enacting credible
fiscal consolidation programs and successful
anti-inflationary policies. 
While there is general agreement that cutting
budget deficits and debt will lower interest rates,
debate persists over the effects on a country’s
exchange rate. At the August 1995 Jackson Hole
symposium on “Budget Deficits and Debt:
Issues and Options” sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, some participants
argued the exchange rate would be strengthened
by deficit reduction, while others argued it
would be weakened. Unfortunately, the evi-
dence on the relationship between budget defi-
cits and the exchange rate does not readily
resolve the debate. In the early 1980s, the rising
U.S. budget deficit was associated with dollar
appreciation, while in the 1990s rising deficits
in Finland, Italy, and Sweden were associated
with currency depreciation.
This article analyzes the effects of budget
deficit reduction on a country’s exchange rate.
The first section shows the evidence on the
relationship between budget deficits and ex-
change rates is not clear-cut and explains why
the theory that underlies the relationship is am-
biguous. To sort out the ambiguity, the second
section provides new empirical results indicat-
ing that deficit reduction through tax increases
tends to weaken the exchange rate of countries
with good records on inflation and debt, while
deficit reduction through spending cuts tends to
strengthen the exchange rate of countries with




The relationship between deficit reduction and
exchange rates has caused a debate among the
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and analysts. Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Greenspan and Governor Thiessen of the Bank
of Canada have argued that deficit reduction
could lead to currency appreciation, while profes-
sors Martin Feldstein and Paul Krugman contend
that deficit reduction would lead to currency
depreciation.
1 This debate over the relationship
between deficit reduction and exchange rates
arises both because the evidence is not clear-cut
and the theory is ambiguous. The evidence shows
that deficit reduction has sometimes been asso-
ciated with a stronger exchange rate and some-
times with a weaker exchange rate. The theory
is ambiguous because deficit reduction has sev-
eral different effects on the exchange rate. Some
effects tend to increase the exchange rate, while
other effects tend to decrease the exchange rate.
The evidence
The evidence shows the empirical relationship
between deficit reduction and exchange rates is
not clear-cut. Charts 1 and 2 show that deficit
reduction leads to a weaker exchange rate in
some countries and a stronger exchange rate in
other countries. Chart 1 plots the government
budget deficit as a share of GDP and the real
trade-weighted exchange rate index for the
United States and Germany from 1979 to 1995.
The solid line shows the regression line relating
the exchange rate to the budget deficit. While
the relationship is not perfect, the upward slop-
ing regression line suggests that both the dollar
and the mark generally rise with an increase in
the budget deficit. The slope of the regression
lines is 3.6 for the United States and 0.5 for
Germany.
2 Thus, the evidence from both the
United States and Germany suggests that a posi-
tive relationship exists between budget deficits
and exchange rates. 
In contrast, the downward sloping regression
line in Chart 2 shows that the Finnish markka
and Swedish krona generally fall with increases
in the budget deficit. The slope of the regression
line is -2.4 for Finland and -0.8 for Sweden.
3
Thus, the evidence from Finland and Sweden
suggests that a negative relationship exists
between budget deficits and exchange rates. 
The evidence on the relationship between
budget deficits and exchange rates also gives
mixed signals when looking at a single country
over time. Chart 3 plots the U.S. budget deficit
as a share of GDP and the real trade-weighted
dollar exchange rate index from 1973 to 1995.
During the early 1980s, the dollar rose with the
budget deficit. From 1989 to 1993, however, the
dollar and budget deficit moved in opposite direc-
tions. Since 1993, the dollar and budget deficit
have once again moved in the same direction.
The theory
It is not surprising that the empirical relation-
ship between deficit reduction and the exchange
rate is unclear because the theoretical relation-
ship is ambiguous. Deficit reduction has several
different effects on the exchange rate, with some
effects leading to a stronger exchange rate and
other effects leading to a weaker exchange rate.
This section examines the direct and indirect
effects of deficit reduction on the demand for
loanable funds which, in turn, can lead to differ-
ent effects on the exchange rate.
Deficit reduction can lead to a weaker exchange
rate. Deficit reduction directly affects interest
rates and exchange rates because it reduces
the demand for loanable funds. When the gov-
ernment runs a budget deficit, it generally
enters financial markets and borrows funds to
pay for the excess of spending over taxes. If
the budget deficit falls, therefore, the govern-
ment needs to borrow less, causing the demand
for funds and thus domestic interest rates to
decline.
4 
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A POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUDGET DEFICITS 
AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
Source: OECD Economic Outlook (budget deficit) and International Financial Statistics (real exchange rate).
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A NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUDGET DEFICITS 
AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
Source: OECD Economic Outlook (budget deficit) and International Financial Statistics (real exchange rate).
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24 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYAs interest rates decline, so does the exchange
rate. When domestic assets pay lower returns,
investors tend to sell lower yielding domestic
securities and buy higher yielding foreign secu-
rities. The decreased demand for domestic
assets and increased demand for foreign assets
both affect the market for foreign currency.
When an investor wants to sell a domestic secu-
rity and buy a foreign security, he does not
actually exchange a domestic security for a for-
eign security. Rather, the investor sells the
domestic security for domestic currency, uses
the domestic currency to buy foreign currency,
and finally uses the foreign currency to buy the
foreign security. The middle transaction—sell-
ing domestic currency and buying foreign cur-
rency—causes the exchange rate to depreciate.
In other words, a fall in interest rates reduces the
demand for the domestic currency in the market
for foreign exchange, causing the exchange rate
to depreciate. 
Deficit reduction can lead to a stronger
exchange rate. While deficit reduction leads
directly to a decrease in the demand for funds
by the government, it may also indirectly lead to
an increase in the demand for funds by private
investors. The increase in the demand for funds
may be brought about by one of three effects, (1)
lower expected inflation, (2) lower foreign
exchange risk premium, and (3) greater expected
rate of return on domestic securities. These
indirect effects induce private investors to
increase their demand for domestic securities
Chart 3
A POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE U.S. BUDGET DEFICIT AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE
Source: International Financial Statistics.
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1996 25relative to foreign securities. As investors switch
from foreign to domestic securities, the exchange
rate would tend to rise. 
First, deficit reduction might reduce expected
inflation. Since some governments finance their
budget deficits simply by printing money, or
having the deficit “monetized” by the monetary
authority, many analysts believe that a projected
string of budget deficits eventually leads to
higher inflation. Therefore, if a country reduces
its budget deficit, long-term inflation expecta-
tions could decline. As Chairman Greenspan
(1995, p. 141) put it, “Many of us who are
central bankers expect that a substantial reduc-
tion in the long-term prospective deficit of the
United States will significantly lower very long-
term inflation expectations vis-a-vis other coun-
tries.” In other words, reducing future budget
deficits may reduce investor fears that the deficit
will eventually be monetized. 
A fall in long-term inflation expectations
could have different effects on the exchange
rate. A fall in expected inflation could reduce the
inflation premium in long-term interest rates,
thereby reducing long-term rates. And since a
fall in long-term interest rates would reduce the
attractiveness of U.S. securities, the exchange
rate would tend to fall. But the tendency for the
exchange rate to fall may be partly offset.
Typically, long-term interest rates do not fall
one-for-one with decreases in expected infla-
tion. For example, if expected inflation falls 100
basis points, the nominal long-term interest rate
may fall only 80 basis points. In such a case, the
real, or inflation adjusted, interest rate would
rise by 20 basis points. Therefore, since the real
interest rate typically rises when expected
inflation falls, the increased attractiveness of
U.S. securities could cause the exchange rate to
rise. Which of these two offsetting effects of
falling long-term inflation expectations has a
greater effect on the exchange rate is an empirical
question. Most analysts believe lower expected
inflation causes the exchange rate to rise
(Mishkin, p. 487). Simply put, they believe that
reducing expected inflation increases investor
confidence in monetary policy, which ultimately
leads to a stronger exchange rate.
Second, deficit reduction might reduce the
riskiness of domestic securities relative to foreign
securities. Just as interest rates contain an infla-
tion premium to compensate for expected inflation,
domestic interest rates also contain a foreign
exchange risk premium to compensate for the
riskiness of domestic securities relative to foreign
securities. According to one theory of the deter-
minants of exchange rates, the foreign exchange
risk premium depends on the relative stock of
domestically issued debt (Melvin, pp. 166-67).
When the budget deficit falls, government borrow-
ing falls, reducing the stock of domestic govern-
ment securities, which in turn causes the foreign
exchange risk premium to fall. When the foreign
exchange risk premium falls, the demand for
domestic securities rises and the currency
strengthens. Simply put, as long as investors
want to hold a diversified portfolio of domestic
and foreign securities, a reduction in the stock of
domestically issued debt causes investors to rebal-
ance their portfolio by bidding for domestic
securities, thereby bidding up the exchange rate.
Deficit reduction could also lower the foreign
exchange risk premium by diminishing the
probability of default. While default is unlikely
for most industrial countries, even a remote
chance of a default could still affect the demand
for domestic securities. Moreover, even if a
country does not default literally, it could impose
restrictions on capital mobility by preventing
capital outflows, or it could impose taxes on
interest income or financial wealth. By reducing
such deterrents to investment, deficit reduction
increases the demand for domestic securities,
leading to an appreciation of the exchange rate.
26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYThird, deficit reduction may increase the
expected return on domestic assets. Deficit
reduction can be achieved by cutting govern-
ment spending or increasing tax rates. The way
the government chooses to use these tools may
have important effects on the expected rate of
return of domestic assets, thereby leading to
changes in the demand for domestic assets and
in turn to changes in the exchange rate. 
By cutting government spending, deficit reduc-
tion shifts resources from the government sector
to the private sector. Consequently, productivity
and long-run potential economic growth could
increase. In addition, if deficit reduction is accom-
panied by a shift in spending from public and
private consumption to investment, productivity
and long-run potential economic growth could
again increase. The U.S. Congressional Budget
Office (August 1995) estimates that balancing
the budget by 2002 could increase growth 0.1
percentage point per year. While this increase
may seem small, it would amount to about a 0.5
percentage point increase in GDP by 2002. As a
result of faster long-run potential growth and
productivity, the expected return on domestic
assets could also increase, thereby leading to
greater demand for U.S. assets and hence a
stronger exchange rate.
The expected return on domestic assets could
increase for yet another reason. All government
spending must be paid for—either by raising
taxes today or by running a budget deficit and
borrowing the money from the public. However,
by running a budget deficit, the government
must eventually raise taxes to make interest
payments in the future. That is, more govern-
ment spending today means higher taxes—
either today or in the future.
Accordingly, deficit reduction could lead to
lower taxes—either today or in the future. Feld-
stein (1995a, p. 407) estimates that if the United
States had run a balanced budget since 1980,
marginal tax rates could have been reduced from
the current 31 percent to 22 percent. And with
lower marginal tax rates, the after-tax rate of
return on domestic assets would increase, leading
to a stronger exchange rate.
5 Moreover, since
marginal tax rates distort incentives, reducing
marginal tax rates would also reduce inefficien-
cies.
6 Again, with a more efficient economy, the
expected return to domestic assets could increase,
thereby leading to an increased demand for U.S.
assets and hence a stronger exchange rate.
What determines the relative size of the
effects?
Since policymakers want to know whether
deficit reduction will cause their currency to rise
or fall, it is necessary to know the relative size
of these different effects. In other words, when do
the indirect effects, which increase the exchange
rate, dominate the direct effect, which decreases
the exchange rate? 
The indirect effects are more likely to domi-
nate the direct effect if deficit reduction is cred-
ible, long term, and sustainable. Only in this case
is deficit reduction likely to have an important
effect on expected inflation, the risk premium,
and the expected rate of return on domestic
securities. Thus, deficit reduction that is cred-
ible, long term, and sustainable will lead private
investors to increase their holding of domes-
tic securities, thereby leading to a stronger
exchange rate. 
The indirect effects are also likely to dominate
the direct effect when the risk of monetization
is large, the risk of default is large, or the
expected return on domestic assets increases
significantly. These conditions are likely to hold
for three reasons. The risk of monetization is
greater for a country with a high rate of inflation
because the country has shown a willingness to
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1996 27tolerate a high rate of inflation. The risk of
default rises with the level of debt. The expected
return on domestic assets increases when the
deficit is cut significantly by reducing a high
level of government spending. Unfortunately, it
is not easy to determine when these effects are
large. 
So, which effects dominate? No answer is
possible without first defining such terms such
as “credible,” “long term,” “sustainable,” and
“large.” Empirical analysis is needed to give
policymakers some practical definitions.
DEFICIT REDUCTION AND
EXCHANGE RATES: SORTING 
OUT THE RELATIONSHIP
A systematic study of the data can help deter-
mine when deficit reduction leads to a stronger
exchange rate and when it leads to a weaker
exchange rate. This section discusses an Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) study of epi-
sodes of deficit reduction, which focused on the
success or failure of such episodes. The results
suggest that large reductions in the budget defi-
cit, coming through spending cuts, are associ-
ated with stronger exchange rates. 
This section also presents a new empirical
model developed to isolate the contributions of
the direct and indirect effects of deficit reduc-
tion. The results of the model suggest that a
country  can increase its exchange rate by reduc-
ing its budget deficit through spending cuts
when inflation is high and government debt is
large because deficit reduction reduces the risk
of monetization and default.
The IMF study
The IMF recently studied 62 episodes of “fis-
cal consolidation” by industrial countries over
the last 25 years.
7 Rather than study the effects
on the exchange rate, the IMF study focused on
the factors that led to significant falls in gross
public debt as a share of GDP. If gross public
debt as a share of GDP fell by at least three
percentage points by the second year after the
end of a fiscal tightening, the IMF said the
episode was “successful.” The authors found
that the real exchange rate rose 5.4 percent on
average in the 14 successful episodes of fiscal
consolidation, while the real exchange rate fell
0.8 percent in the 48 unsuccessful cases. There-
fore, by studying the determinants of successful
episodes of fiscal consolidation, some clues can
be gleaned about when deficit reduction leads to
a stronger exchange rate. 
The IMF study noted that the average size of
the two-year fiscal contraction was larger in
successful episodes than in unsuccessful epi-
sodes—4.0 percent of potential GDP versus 3.2
percent. According to the authors, 
A more timid commitment to fiscal consoli-
dation may be more likely to fail than a strong
one. This may be partly due to a nonlinear
relationship between fiscal policy and output
growth, whereby small reductions in budget
deficits may reduce aggregate demand, while
large adjustments may revive confidence and
expectations so that growth is given a boost
(IMF, p. 59).
In other words, if large fiscal contractions are
viewed as credible, long term, and sustainable,
the increase in demand by private investors
dominates the decrease in demand by the gov-
ernment, so the exchange rate appreciates.
The IMF study also found that reducing the
budget deficit by cutting spending was typically
associated with successful episodes of fiscal
consolidation. The study divided the episodes of
fiscal contraction into cases in which at least 60
percent of the deficit reduction came from reve-
nue increases and cases in which at least 60
28 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYpercent came from expenditure cuts. Table 1
shows that of the cases where the fiscal contrac-
tion came primarily from expenditure cuts, 41
percent were successful and 59 percent were
unsuccessful. In contrast, of the cases that came
primarily from revenue increases, 16 percent
were successful and 84 percent were unsuccess-
ful. One can conclude that the success or failure
of the fiscal package depends on whether deficit
reduction came primarily from reducing spend-
ing or raising taxes.
8 
In addition, the IMF study found that average
expenditure cuts were 3-3/4 percent of GDP
for the successful episodes versus only 2 percent
for the unsuccessful episodes. This finding is con-
sistent with the fact that fiscal consolidation that
occurs through significant cuts in spending, rather
than increases in taxes, leads to greater productiv-
ity, higher long-run potential growth, and lower
marginal tax rates. All three of these effects, in
turn, lead to an increase in the after-tax real rate
of return and an appreciating exchange rate.
The empirical model
An empirical model can be developed to more
systematically study the effects of deficit reduc-
tion and to separate the direct from the indirect
effects. The following equation relates the real
exchange rate to the budget deficit: 
real exchange rate = a +
b [budget  deficit  as a share of GDP]
 + error term.
(1)
The sign and magnitude of b show whether the
exchange rate increases or decreases following a
change in the budget deficit. If b is positive, then
an increase in the budget deficit leads to currency
appreciation, and a decrease in the deficit leads to
currency depreciation. Similarly, if b is negative,
an increase in the budget deficit leads to currency
depreciation, and a decrease in the deficit leads to
currency appreciation. In other words, a positive
b means deficit reduction weakens the currency,
Table 1
THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF FISCAL CONSOLIDATION
(Percent)




Note: There were 37 episodes where revenues increased and 17 episodes where expenditures decreased. For eight
of the 62 episodes of fiscal contraction, the reduction in the budget deficit was split about equally between revenue
increases and expenditure cuts.
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, Table 13, p. 61.
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strengthens the currency.
The actual estimated model differs from equa-
tion 1 in three ways. First, other variables are
included that capture the dynamic effects of time
and interest rate differentials. A time trend is
included to capture any long-run movements
in the real exchange rate. The long-term interest
rate differential is included because it is an
important determinant of exchange rate move-
ments. And, a lagged value of the real exchange
rate is included to capture short-run dynamics
in the adjustment process. Second, the model is
estimated using annual data for 18 OECD
countries from 1979 to 1994 (Appendix B). By
using data from many countries over many years,
the model can yield more precise estimates
of the direct and indirect effects of deficit
reduction.
The third, and most important, modification
involves redefining b in equation 1 to separate
the direct and indirect effects of deficit reduc-
tion. The indirect effects of deficit reduction are
captured by including proxies that measure the
expected inflation, risk premium, and expected
rate of return effects. 
Incorporating these three modifications leads
to the following equation (Appendix A):
real exchange rate = a + b0i [directeffect]
+ b1 [expected inflation effect]
+ b2 [risk premium effect]
+ b3[expected rate or return  effect]
+ other variables
+ error term (2)
As shown in the equation, four different b’s are
estimated for each country. The specific proxies
used to measure the direct and indirect effects are
discussed with the results.
Results
Model estimates can be used to answer two
questions. Are the direct and indirect effects
significant in explaining how deficit reduction
affects the exchange rate? And, for each country
in the sample, how much would the exchange
rate change if the country reduced its budget
deficit?
The results in Table 2 can be used to answer
both questions. The answer to the first question
depends on the sign and statistical significance
of the parameter estimates.
The direct effect of deficit reduction is esti-
mated by the coefficient b0. Since the direct
effect of deficit reduction leads to a weaker
exchange rate, economic theory suggests that
b0 should be positive. The direct effect is esti-
mated as the coefficient on the difference between
the budget deficit as a share of GDP and the
OECD average budget deficit as a share of GDP.
The reason for using the difference between the
budget deficit and the OECD average is that
theory suggests the direct effect of deficit reduc-
tion for a single country leads to a weaker
exchange rate. But, if all countries cut their
budget deficits, it is not possible for all exchange
rates to fall. Thus, the model imposes the restric-
tion that if all countries cut their budget deficits,
there is no effect on the exchange rate.
In Table 2, a separate b0 is estimated for each
country. The results provide mixed evidence on
the theory since 13 of the estimates are negative
and five are positive. However, only seven of the
estimates are significantly negative. While these
results are troubling, they are not sufficient to
totally reject the model. The result may simply
reflect the fact that some important determinants
of the exchange rate were excluded from the
model. If true, then the direct effect may be picking
up the influence of these excluded variables.
9
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coefficient b1. In the model, if country i’s infla-
tion rate is high, investors may believe that country
i’s monetary authority is more likely to monetize
its budget deficit than if the inflation rate were
low. Accordingly, by reducing its budget deficit,
and thus the risk of monetization, country i’s
exchange rate may appreciate. For this reason,
the proxy used to measure the expected inflation
effect is country i’s inflation rate relative to the
average OECD inflation rate. Since deficit re-
duction—operating through the expected inflation
effect—leads to a stronger exchange rate, economic
theory suggests b1 should be negative. Although
b1 is constrained to be equal for all currencies,
the expected inflation effect is allowed to be
different for each country because the inflation
rate differential is different for each country.
As predicted, the expected inflation effect is
negative and significant. The coefficient, however,
is small. For example, suppose a country’s infla-
tion rate is ten percentage points greater than the
average OECD rate. Then, a one percentage
point fall in the budget deficit as a share of GDP
would cause the real exchange rate index to rise
0.64 points—or about two-thirds of 1 percent. 
The risk premium effect is estimated by the
coefficient b2. The proxy used to measure the
risk premium effect is the stock of government
debt (as a percent of GDP) relative to the OECD
average. That is, if debt is high, then the risk of
default is greater. Consequently, by reducing its
budget deficit, the risk of default—or the risk
premium—falls, causing the exchange rate to
rise. Since deficit reduction—operating through
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
Direct effect
United States -.653 Belgium -.474
Japan 2.787 Sweden -.912
Germany -1.608 Austria .905
France -.306 Denmark -.076
Italy 1.169 Finland -2.815
United Kingdom .232 Greece -.006
Canada -.344 Portugal .326
Spain -1.714 Norway -.445
Netherlands -.580 Australia -2.224
Note: Variables and coefficients in bold are significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 2
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF b
Variable Coefficient
Indirect effects
Expected inflation effect -.064
Risk premium effect -.018
Expected rate of return effect .326
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the exchange rate, economic theory suggests b2
should be negative. Although b2 is constrained to
be equal for all currencies, the risk premium effect
is allowed to be different for each country because
the risk premium is different for each country.
As predicted, the risk premium effect is negative
and significant. However, again the effect is small.
If a country’s ratio of debt to GDP is ten percent-
age points greater than the OECD average—that
is, if the risk premium is large—then reducing
the budget deficit by one percentage point of
GDP would increase the exchange rate by 0.18
point, or about one-fifth of 1 percent.
The expected rate of return effect is estimated by
the coefficient b3. Governments can cut their
budget deficit by cutting government spending
or by raising taxes. The previous theory suggests
that cutting the budget deficit by cutting govern-
ment spending would tend to increase the expected
rate of return and lead to a stronger exchange
rate. For this reason, the proxy used to measure the
expected rate of return effect is the change in
government spending (as a share of GDP). Since
a reduction in the budget deficit accompanied by
a reduction in government spending leads to a
stronger exchange rate, b3 should be positive.
As predicted, the expected rate of return effect
is positive and significant. Moreover, the effect
appears to be similar in size to the expected
inflation and risk premium effect. If a country
cuts its budget deficit by one percentage point
of GDP through reducing government spending
by one percentage point of GDP, the model
predicts the exchange rate would rise by 0.33
point, or about one-third of 1 percent.
The model also provides answers to the
second question: For each country in the sample,
how much would the exchange rate change if the
country reduced its budget deficit? The answer
to this question is given in Chart 4, which shows
the effect of deficit reduction on each country’s
exchange rate. The top panel shows the results
for the G7 countries and the bottom panel shows
the results for the other countries. The bars
show the percent change in the real exchange
rate from reducing the budget deficit as a share
of GDP by one percentage point. The left bar
assumes government spending is cut by one per-
centage point of GDP; the right bar assumes gov-
ernment revenue is increased by one percentage
point of GDP.
10 To calculate the expected infla-
tion and risk premium effects, data on inflation
and debt from 1994 were used.
11
For the G7 countries, deficit reduction leads
to a stronger exchange rate in the United States,
Germany, France, Italy, and Canada, and leads
to a weaker exchange rate in Japan and Eng-
land.
12 In each case, the model predicts that the
exchange rate strengthens more—or weakens
less—when deficit reduction occurs by reducing
spending than by raising taxes. For example, if
the U.S. budget deficit is reduced by cutting
spending, the dollar exchange rate rises by 0.7
percent; however, if it occurs by raising taxes,
the dollar rises just 0.3 percent. In France, re-
ducing the budget deficit by cutting spending
strengthens the franc, while cutting the deficit
by raising taxes weakens the franc. Since Italian
inflation and gross debt as a share of GDP are
both greater than the OECD average, it seems
reasonable that deficit reduction will strengthen
the Italian lira. In all cases, the effect of deficit
reduction on the exchange rate is small—less
than 1.5 percent. The small effect of deficit
reduction on the exchange rate is not surprising
since it is unlikely that investors fear the central
banks in the G7 countries will monetize the
budget deficit or that the government’s will de-
fault or impose capital controls.
13
The bottom panel of Chart 4 shows that deficit
reduction is also predicted to lead to a stronger
32 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYNote: AUS denotes Austria and AST denotes Australia.
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tries. Many of these results are not surprising.
Greek inflation and gross debt are both greater
than the OECD average, so it is not surprising
that deficit reduction is predicted to strengthen
the Greek drachma. In fact, of the five cases in
which inflation and gross debt are greater than
the OECD average (Netherlands, Portugal, Italy,
Greece, and Belgium), deficit reduction is pre-
dicted to lead to a stronger exchange rate in each
case. In addition, for each of the seven countries
with the largest ratios of debt to GDP, deficit reduc-
tion is predicted to lead to a stronger exchange
rate. Finally, the results are consistent with Chart
2, which showed the Finnish markka and Swed-
ish krona rise when the budget deficit falls. The
effect of deficit reduction on the exchange rate in
both Portugal and Norway depends on whether
the budget deficit is cut by cutting spending or
by raising taxes. The currency is predicted to rise
if spending is cut and fall if taxes are raised.
Deficit reduction is predicted to weaken the
Austrian schilling because the direct effect of
deficit reduction dominates the indirect effects.
CONCLUSION
Budget deficit reduction has both direct and
indirect effects on the demand for funds, which
lead to different effects on the exchange rate.
Deficit reduction can lead to a weaker exchange
rate by reducing the demand for funds by the
government, or it can lead to a stronger exchange
rate either by reducing expected inflation, reducing
the foreign exchange risk premium, or increasing
the expected after-tax rate of return on domestic
assets. Because of these different effects, it is
not surprising that deficit reduction leads to a
weaker exchange rate for some countries and to
a stronger exchange rate for other countries.
The article provides policymakers several key
insights into when budget deficit reduction
leads to a stronger exchange rate. First, deficit
reduction must convince private investors to
increase their demand for domestic securities.
Second, according to the IMF study and the
empirical model, deficit reduction tends to lead
to a stronger exchange rate if the reduction is
large, if it occurs through cutting government
spending, if a country’s inflation rate is high
(so the chance of monetization is high), or if a
country’s ratio of gross debt to GDP is high (so
the chance of default is high). Of course, none
of these factors, by themselves, will guarantee
that budget deficit reduction will lead to a
stronger exchange rate. Hence, the third key
insight is that budget deficit reduction must be
viewed by private investors as credible, long
term, and sustainable. 
While fiscal credibility is difficult to achieve,
the Canadian experience in reducing its
budget deficit offers useful guidance. Particu-
larly relevant to the Canadian experience—and
to the achievement of fiscal credibility—is the
following statement by Finance Minister Paul
Martin made at the August 1995 Jackson Hole
symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City (1995, p. 216):
We have also decided to adopt a two-year
budget horizon—rolling the second year’s
target forward one year at a time. This is
central to our overall strategy. We have re-
jected the traditional approach where typi-
cally a balanced budget would be projected
five or more years down the line. Frankly,
that is political never-never land for the sim-
ple reason that elections intervene before the
magic date arrives. Political accountability is
lost and the bureaucracy can safely put off the
day when they really have to buckle down
and find the savings. The result, as we saw in
Canada during at least the last ten years, is a
progression of missed targets, looming fiscal
crisis, and growing public cynicism.
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MODEL DESCRIPTION
The model relates the real exchange rate
to the budget deficit. To control for factors
that affect the exchange rate other than
the budget deficit, a linear time trend, long-
term interest rate differential, and a lagged
real exchange rate are included. More spe-
cifically, the model can be written as:
qit = ai + bit BDit
 + g1i trend t + g2i[i it
LT - i OECD t
LT ]
+ riqit + eit



































where qit = real exchange rate, BDit = budget
deficit relative to GDP of country i, inflait =
CPI inflation rate, i
LT = long-term interest rate,
D/Y = gross debt as a percent of GDP, and
G/Yit = government consumption as a percent
of GDP.
This is a time-series cross-section model.
It is estimated using fixed effects, so that a
separate constant term is estimated for each
country. A seemingly unrelated regression
procedure is used, so that the error terms are
correlated across exchange rate equations.
The covariance matrix across exchange rate
equations is estimated in a preliminary re-
gression and then applied in generalized
least squares in a second round.
The model was also estimated including
the growth rate of real GDP relative to the
average OECD growth rate. However, the
procedure did not converge because the co-
variance matrix was nearly singular.
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DESCRIPTION OF DATA
Most of the data were obtained from the
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). The following
is a brief description of the variables.
Budget deficit. The  general  government
financial balance as a percent of nominal
GDP. Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, OECD Economic Outlook,
Annex Table 30, December 1995.
 GDP.  Nominal gross domestic product,
in local currency units. Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development,
OECD Economic Outlook database, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Debt.  Government gross debt, in local
currency units. Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, OECD Eco-
nomic Outlook database, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System.
Inflation. Percent  change  in  consumer
prices. Consumer prices are an index, with
1990 = 100. International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics database,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
Real exchange rate.  Real effective ex-
change rate index, 1990 = 100. The index
equals the nominal effective exchange rate,
weighted by trade in manufactures, deflated
by relative normalized unit labor costs in
manufacturing. International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics da-
tabase, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
Government spending. Government  con-
sumption, in local currency units. Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and
Development, OECD Economic Outlook
database, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
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1 For example, Chairman Greenspan (1995, p. 141) stated:
“I think the point that central bankers are making is that
lower long-term inflation expectations can significantly
overwhelm the short-term interest rate effects, and through
arbitrage back to the spot rate, firm it.” Similarly, Governor
Thiessen (1995, p. 139) stated: “I must say, in more open
economies we certainly worry about the net accumulation
of foreign liabilities that comes from running an ongoing
public deficit and public debt.... And, what that leads to, of
course, is a depreciating exchange rate to generate the trade
surplus that you need. So, in the long run, you expect an
accumulation of public debt to lead to an accumulation of
net foreign liabilities and a weaker currency.” In contrast,
Krugman (1995) and Feldstein (1995b) argue that reducing
the budget deficit would lead to a weaker currency.
2 The relation is statistically insignificant. The t-statistic is
0.84 for the United States and 0.21 for Germany.
3 The relation is statistically significant. The t-statistic is
-8.1 for Finland and -1.8 for Sweden.
4 Some economists argue that deficit reduction has no
effect on interest rates. They believe that while deficit
reduction leads to a decrease in the demand for funds, it
also leads to an equal decrease in the supply of funds.
Because future taxes will be less, consumers need to save
less so the supply of funds falls. While the evidence is
mixed, most economists believe that deficit reduction leads
to a lower interest rate.
5 Actually, the after-tax rate of return on domestic assets
and foreign assets, held by domestic investors, would
increase. However, since domestic investors tend to hold
more domestic securities than foreign securities, the
exchange rate would still rise.
6 Feldstein (1995a, p. 407) states, “If we didn’t have to pay
interest on the deficits accumulated since 1980, the
deadweight loss of the personal income tax would be cut
in half. . . . The taxes that are required to pay the resulting
interest to ourselves distorts incentives and causes a
massive deadweight loss, probably more than $100 billion
a year at current levels.” 
7 The IMF defines fiscal impulse as the change in the
primary structural balance relative to potential GDP. Then,
an episode of fiscal consolidation occurs when the fiscal
impulse shows tightening in two successive years,
amounting to at least 1-1/2 percentage points of GDP in
total. Successful fiscal consolidation occurs when the ratio
of gross public debt to GDP falls at least three percentage
points by the second year after the end of a two-year fiscal
tightening.
8 One can test the null hypothesis that success or failure is
independent of whether deficit reduction comes from
reducing spending or raising taxes. The X2(1) statistic was
3.94; the 5 percent critical value is 3.84. Therefore, one can
reject the null hypothesis of independence at the 5 percent
level.
9 One bit of evidence supports this interpretation. Different
specifications of the model lead to different estimates of
b0.
10 Technically, the left bar assumes the change in
government spending (as a percent of GDP) equals -1 and
the right bar assumes the change in government spending
(as a percent of GDP) equals 0.
11 In order to estimate the direct effect, one must make an
assumption about how a change in the budget deficit affects
the OECD average. Since the OECD average budget deficit
is a weighted average of individual country budget deficits,
it can be written as BD[OECD] = w(1)*BD[1] +
w(2)*BD[2] + ... + w(18)*BD[18]. The model assumes
that the change in BD[OECD] due to a change in BD[i]
equals w(i).
12 Standard errors for the change in the exchange rate can
be calculated as follows. The change in the exchange rate
from a one percentage point change in the budget deficit is
given by the second equation in the Model Description
Appendix. The calculation assumes that parameter
uncertainty is the only source of uncertainty. Thus, using
the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters, and the
actual values of the variables in 1994, one can calculate the
standard deviation of bit. Significant effects are found for
Japan, Germany, Canada, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden.
13 Much of the predicted effect of deficit reduction comes
from the b0 parameter. As discussed in the text, this
parameter measures the direct effect of deficit reduction
and is predicted to be positive. In many cases, however, the
parameter is negative. Moreover, the parameter is often a
“large” negative number and often is larger than the
negative indirect effects. Nonetheless, the indirect effects
are negative, as predicted by the theory.
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